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Very few notions – amongst those someone may come across while 
rummaging the history of ideas1 – are less obscure and ambiguous than 
the one signified by the term supernatural2. Yet it could not have been 
otherwise, since the very word itself foreshadows nothing but puzzling 
ambiguity. For, to be specific, we tend to use the term supernatural when 
we need to describe – or, in general, to refer to – everything that tran-
scends what is thought to be natural3, to wit what we tend to perceive as 
attuned to the natural order of things and events4. However, as for what 
is actually natural, and in what exactly that natural order consists, hard-
1. “the natural-supernatural antithesis has had its own complex history in West-
ern thought.”, A. I. Hallowell, “Ojibwa Ontology, Behavior, and World View,” in Culture 
in History: Essays in Honor of Paul Radin, Stanley Diamond (ed.), Columbia University 
Press, New York 1960, p. 28.
2. “The supernatural may mean that which is above the created order of things. It may 
mean the spiritual as distinct from the physical. It may mean the miraculous, considered 
as an event outside the course of nature, produced by divine action. Popularly, it means 
ghosts. Ecclesiastically, it has been used to mean a sort of hypostasized grace conveyed by 
the church and sacraments. Here is confusion of every kind. No very cheerful prospect lies 
before one who would discuss the supernatural. It is like wrestling with Achelous”, Edward 
S. Drown, “What Is the Supernatural?”, The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 
(Apr., 1913), p. 144.
3. “In order to say that certain things are supernatural it is necessary to have the senti-
ment that a natural order of things exists, that is to say, that the phenomena of the uni-
verse are bound together by necessary relations, called laws”, Emile Durkheim, The Ele-
mentary Forms of the Religious Life, Free Press 1965, p. 41.
4. “That is above nature; belonging to a higher realm or system than that of nature; 
transcending the powers or the ordi-nary course of nature”, Oxford English Dictionary.
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ly could one assume5 that there is even rudimentary unanimity among 
those thinkers who have employed their spirit with the matter in ques-
tion. Therefore, whether one wishes to deal with the supernatural as an 
isolated term, or in relation with any other being or circumstance, it is ut-
terly impossible to do so if prior to that he doesn’t endeavor to define the 
import – grosso modo, at least – of the term “natural”.
I.
The most habitual and common use of the term natural corresponds 
to that which is – or could be – property of our experience, irrespective 
of whether that experience is mental or physical, viz. whatever can be 
known, perceived, determined and categorized by human mind, after it 
has bumped into and passed through the channels of our senses. The co-
operation between our intellectual and sensual capabilities in relation to 
the usurpation of what is considered to be “natural”, is extremely crucial 
for us to presume something as such, even if we are not familiar with – or 
sympathetic to – the duality of the kantian Theory of knowledge. That is 
inasmuch as the human mind, to be specific, is characterized by the in-
trinsic ability to conceive and contemplate on beings or events, which any-
thing but belong to the natural order of things, beings such as Pegasus or 
the Valkyries, for instance, and counterfactual realities like the Purgatory 
or the Valhalla. Our sensory equipment, on the other hand, is quite sus-
ceptible to offering sensational data which could in no way be appreciated 
as properties or attributes of natural entities and events. A vast series of 
totally convinced miracle eye witnesses serves as an irrefutable proof for 
this. Miracles, though, could on no account presumed to be natural phe-
nomena. Accordingly, any being or event which is not apprehensible by 
the senses and the intellect at the same time, could count as supernatural.
Another meaning of the term supernatural, close to the one previously 
cited, is that which implies the existence of entities that do not belong to 
the wholeness of created things. According to that view there exist two 
separate orders of beings: created and uncreated ones, to wit the world 
5. “the word nature is probably the most equivocal in the vocabulary of the European 
peoples”, Arthur Lovejoy and George Boas, Prolegomena to the History of Primitivism, 
and Related Ideas in Antiquity. chap. 1, Johns Hopkins Press 1935, p. 12.
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and the beings it entails, and God along with his acts, or the divine sub-
stance in general. Resulting from that approach, which we could call re-
stricted, there is an elaborated one as well, according to which, the term 
supernatural refers to superhuman or super earthly beings, such as an-
gels, demons, the heavens etc.
Apart from these imports of the term supernatural, there is a some-
what more vague third one, on which we intent to focus a bit intensely. 
According to that view, the employment of two distinct orders – or na-
tures – of being is not at all valid. Therefore the distinction between the 
natural and the supernatural is a forged one, superimposed to our com-
prehension of the world by the limitations of our mind. The distinction in 
question only prima facie appears to explain the nature of beings, but it 
proves to be unstable when subjected to thorough scrutiny6. For actually 
nature is inclusive of all beings or events, that run into our sensual and 
intellectual capabilities7. Since our intellect has the ability to capture the 
import of God, then God is as natural as a butterfly. According to Theo-
dore Parker, God is the most natural of beings8. Duns Erigena believed 
that nature includes all things, created and uncreated9. Even miracles are 
6. “The wind bloweth where it listeth, and some of the energies granted to men born of 
the spirit may be manifested only on certain conditions and on rare occasions; and there-
fore be always wonderful and miraculous, though neither disorderly, nor unnatural. Thus 
St. Paul’s argument to the Agrippa Why should it be thought with you a thing impossible 
that God should raise the dead should be suicidal, if he meant to appeal to the miracle as 
a proof of the authority of his mission. But claiming no authority, he announces as a prob-
able and acceptable fact the opening of a dispensation, in which it was as natural for the 
dead to be raised, as for the Gospel to be preached to be preached to the poor, though both 
the one and the other were miraculous signs that the Master of Nature has come down 
to be Emmanuel among men, and that no prophet was in the future to look for another”, 
John Ruskin, On the Old Road: A Collection of Miscellaneous Essays, Pamphlets, etc, vol-
ume 2, Adamant 2005, p. 362-3.
7.  According to the famous Pablo Picasso’s adage: “Everything is a miracle. It is a mir-
acle that one does not dissolve in one’s bath like a lump of sugar”.
8. George T. Knight, “The Definition of the Supernatural”, The Harvard Theological 
Review, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1910), p. 311.
9. “Saepe mihi cogitanti, diligentiusque quantum vires suppetunt inquirenti, rerum 
omnium, quae vel animo percipi possunt, vel intetionem ejus superant, primam sum-
maque divisionem esse in ea quae sunt, et in ea quae non sunt, horum omnium generale 
vocabulum occurrit, quod graece φύσις, latine vero natura vocitatur”, Erigena Joannes 
Scotus, Peri Physeos Merismou, id est De Divisione Naturae libri cinque, Migne, Patrolo-
gia Latina, v. 122, 0441A
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absolutely natural, if we abide by the beliefs of Friedrich Nietzsche and 
W. A. Brown. According to the former10 miracles correspond to an inner 
human need, that of deliberate self-mockery11, which renders men reluc-
tant to interpret natural phenomena12. In the latter’s opinion, a miracle 
is the most natural of all events13. It is only a matter of perspective: a hu-
man act may be super-doggish, and a divine act superhuman, but both 
of them are absolutely natural, says Ruskin14. If the natural and the su-
pernatural are so closely interconnected, as to be seen as interdependent 
and overlapping, then the boundaries of each one fade away in a manner 
which indicates that a borderline may even not exist at all. The natural 
and the supernatural become identical, so as one could maintain that ei-
ther all natural things are at the same time supernatural, or the exactly 
10. “One kind of honesty has been unknown to all founders of religions and their likes 
-- they have never made of their experiences a matter of conscience and knowledge. “What 
did I really experience? What happened in me and around me then? Was my mind suffi-
ciently alert? Was my will bent against fantasy?” -- none of them has asked such questions, 
none of our dear religious people asks such questions even now: they feel, rather, a thirst 
for things which are contrary to reason and do not put too many difficulties in the way of 
satisfying it -- thus they experience “miracles” and “rebirths” and hear the voices of an-
gels!”, Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff, Adrian Del Caro, 
ed. Bernard Williams, Cambridge University Press 2001, p. 180.
11. Christianity has done its utmost to close the circle and declared even doubt to be 
sin. One is supposed to be cast into belief without reason, by a miracle, and from then on to 
swim in it as in the brightest and least ambiguous of elements: even a glance towards land, 
even the thought that one perhaps exists for something else as well as swimming, even the 
slightest impulse of our amphibious nature -- is sin! And notice that all this means that the 
foundation of belief and all reflection on its origin is likewise excluded as sinful. What is 
wanted are blindness and intoxication and an eternal song over the waves in which reason 
has drowned”  Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, 
trans. R J Hollingdale, Cambridge University Press 1997, p. 52..
12. “How’s that? The “miracle” is only a failure of interpretation? A lack of philology?”, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. 
Marion Faber, Oxford University Press 2009, p. 46.
13. George T. Knight, “The Definition of the Supernatural”, The Harvard Theological 
Review, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1910), p. 311.
14. “We have indeed come to use the words supernatural and superhuman, as if equiv-
alent. A  human act may be super-doggish, and a divine act superhuman, yet all three acts 
absolutely  natural. It is, perhaps, as much the virtue of a Spirit to be inconstant as of a 
poison to be sure, and therefore always impossible to weigh the elements of moral force 
in the balance of an apothecary”, Ruskin John, On the Old Road: A Collection of Miscel-
laneous Essays, Pamphlets, etc, 2nd vol., Adamant 2005, p. 363. 
 ‘Supernatural Will’ and ‘Organic Unityin Process’ 177
opposite. From that point of view supernatural is either considered as not 
at all existing, or as all-inclusive, since it embraces all beings and every 
event. Schelling adopts the latter view, insisting that nature, creation, is 
not the mere phenomenon and revelation of the Eternal, but it is rather 
the very Eternal itself15.
All three above mentioned approaches are seemingly quite legitimate, 
but though not helpful at all. That is because what they mainly do is to 
describe but not explain what supernatural is. They focus on how super-
natural manifests itself in a world of natural entities, how it functions 
and what makes it distinct from what is usually called natural, but they 
enlighten us next to nothing on what really supernatural is, or as what 
should we be justified to perceive it. 
The first approach in fact endeavors to describe that which is not su-
pernatural. It proudly announces what we already know, to wit that su-
pernatural cannot be grasped through the coordinated effort and coop-
eration of our sensory and intellectual equipment. But as for its real es-
sence, hardly anything is added to our knowledge. 
If we turn to the second view, we can only convince ourselves that 
there exist beings such as angels, demons, God etc. Yet we enrich our 
knowledge not even with the slightest idea about the properties or the es-
sence of such beings, apart from the fact that they belong to a supernat-
ural order of existence. Actually it is like if someone was asking: “What 
does the Supernatural consist in?”, and receiving the answer: “It is the 
God, the angels, some demons etc.” However, when he expectedly comes 
to ask: “So, what exactly God, demons, angels etc. are?” he is surprised to 
be informed that: “They are just supernatural entities.” At the end of the 
day, we evidently know nothing either about the supernatural, or about 
God, angels and demons. 
15. “in everlasting nature the godhead now recognizes its’ own eternal nature and is 
from now on, albeit free with respect to nature and neither bound to nor grown together 
with it, nevertheless inseparable from it”, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The 
Ages of the World: (fragment) from the Handwritten Remains, 3rd Version, trans. Jason 
M. Wirth, SUNY Press 2000, p. 38 and “Nature should be Mind made visible, Mind the in-
visible Nature. Here then, in the absolute identity of mind inside us and nature outside 
us”, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature: as Intro-
duction to the Study of this Science, trans. E.E. Harris and P. Heath, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1988.
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The third approach tends to identify the natural order of beings with 
the supernatural, leaving unaddressed the primary question about the es-
sence of what is deemed to be supernatural, as well as the utterly justifi-
able suspicion that if natural and supernatural were indeed of identical 
essence, people would not have since the dawn of time felt the urge to 
distinguish between these two notions. It also produces a rather episte-
mological problem, which we are just about to address. 
II.
The last viewpoint unavoidably leads us to two seemingly contradic-
tive tracks: we either have to altogether reject the notion of any kind of 
supernatural existence and, accordingly, any order of beings or reality to 
which the notion in question seems to correspond, or to completely iden-
tify and equate the natural and the supernatural order of beings. In any 
case, consequently, there exists only one order of beings, part of which – 
as Ruskin implies – is at a given time incomprehensible and inaccessible 
to us16. In other words, either a) whatever exists is natural, and only that 
actually exists, or b) whatever exists is supernatural, and only that actu-
ally exists. In both cases, the limitation and inadequacy of the senses and 
the intellect render us incapable of grasping the whole picture.
Although these viewpoints seem to be intrinsically contradictive, let us 
be allowed for the sake of our investigation to consider them identical. 
For the point, in which they differentiate from each other, is solely the 
aspect from which they face what they presume to be the one and only 
existing order of beings. Under the scope of the first view the one and 
only order of beings ought to be addressed to as natural, while the second 
one names it supernatural. Yet they both adopt a holistic view of reality, 
inasmuch they accept only one order of beings. They presume that what-
ever bumps into perception actually exists, irrespective of our ability to 
16. “Portenta esse Varro ait quae contra naturam nata videntur: sed non sunt contra 
naturam, quia divina voluntate fiunt, cum voluntas Creatoris cuiusque conditae rei natura 
sit. Vnde et ipsi gentiles Deum modo Naturam, modo Deum appellant. Portentum ergo non 
fit contra naturam, sed contra quam est nota natura. Portenta autem et ostenta, monstra 
atque prodigia ideo nuncupantur, quod portendere atque ostendere,monstrare ac praedi-
care aliqua futura videntur.”, Isidori Hispalensis Episcopi Etymologiarum sive Originum, 
Liber XI, 3:1, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1911.
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explain, understand or totally grasp it17. They also allow for other possible 
parts of the one and only reality, which so far have not become manifest. 
Yet comprehensible or incomprehensible, manifest or veiled, the actual 
order of beings is just one, and all entities exist in the same degree, re-
gardless with their interaction to human perception. 
III.
Since all three above cited approaches leave open the question about 
the essence of the supernatural, let us be excused to proceed with – and 
modestly propose – an alternative one. 
It really seems to be unattainable to directly grasp the notion of the 
supernatural. Thus, a crooked line of reasoning seems if not the only per-
missible, at least the most effective one. So lets leave aside for a while the 
obscure term supernatural and focus on what we perceive as natural. Al-
beit many definitions of the term natural have time and again been pro-
posed, I feel that the most irrefutable approach would only but underpin 
the fact that natural is manifest to exist in harmony and under the con-
trol of the so called laws of nature. In other words, natural is only what 
can be explained by virtue of the laws of nature, or, at least, even if that 
is not possible at the present, we feel that in the future we could discover 
the natural laws who produce or govern it. That means that, even if the 
underlying law may not be evident or profound, the very being or phe-
nomenon does not exist or take place contrary to any of the laws of na-
ture. Every being or phenomenon that conforms to the laws of nature is 
presumed to be natural. But what exactly do we mean when we attribute 
the property of naturality to a being or a phenomenon? About every-
thing that exists in the realm of the physical world we can ask whether 
“Whence?” or “Why?” In other words we can query its’ efficient and its’ 
final causes. Suppose someone observes the famous La Pedrera, the ar-
chitectural masterpiece of Gaudi. We can ask “Whence?” and “Why?” it 
was built. By the first question we investigate the antecedent conditions 
17. “Hoc certe Varro tantus auctor portentum non appellaret, nisi esse contra naturam 
uideretur. Omnia quippe portenta contra naturam dicimus esse; sed non sunt. Quo modo 
est enim contra naturam, quod Dei fit uoluntate, cum uoluntas tanti utique conditoris con-
ditae rei cuiusque natura sit? Portentum ergo fit non contra naturam, sed contra quam est 
nota natura”, Augustini De Civitate Dei Contra Paganos, k.G. Sauer Verlag 1998, XXI, vii.
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which lie behind the achievement, its’ efficient causes, to wit the clay and 
the water of the bricks, the cement, the iron skeleton which sustains it, 
etc. But the enumeration of the efficient causes will apparently not suf-
fice. For a building is something more than the raw material from which 
it was composed, just like an orchestral suite is much more than the notes 
on the composer’s score. In order to fully explain the building as well as 
the suite, we have to ask “Why it was built or composed?”, to wit we have 
to pin point and reveal its final cause, the purpose either of the architect 
or the composer. If we succeed in doing so, we feel that we have secured 
an ample explanation of the being in question. It is obvious that, while ef-
ficient causes belong to the dominion of nature, final causes do not. That 
is because final causes are narrowly tied upon the will of the doer, which 
obeys none of the laws of nature. This is the reason why natural scienc-
es ever since Bacon are reluctant to examine final causes, while on the 
other hand are ardently directed to efficient ones. Scientia est rerum co-
gnoscere causas and, in Bacon’s words, the investigation of final causes 
is like a consecrated virgin, it produces nothing18. The laws of nature, to 
which every natural being, event or process obey, do offer a quite conve-
nient regularity, something which does not at all apply to the functions of 
the will19. Although human will supersedes nature and its laws, it is not 
the very will what we tend to regard as supernatural. That’s because hu-
man deeds, no matter how dependant on the will of the agent, are still 
bound together with their efficient conditions. Even in the most irratio-
nal human reaction, we can still detect efficient causes. Suppose a fellow 
of yours all of a sudden decides to cut off his limp. Though totally irra-
tional, his act is still determined by antecedent conditions which lie be-
neath it, produce it or allow it to happen. An efficient cause, for example, 
for someone to amputate himself, might have been a momentarily lack 
of reason, or preexisting mental condition, even the fact that a razor was 
handy, etc. The final cause lies in the fact that he simply intended to mu-
18. Francis Bacon, Collected Works of Francis Bacon, Routledge 1996, p. 56.
19. “And I say this, not because those final causes are not true and worthy to be in-
quired in metaphysical speculations; but because their excursions and irruptions into the 
limits of physical causes has bred a waste and solitude in that track. For other wise, if they 
be but kept within their proper bounds, men are extremely deceived if they think there is 
any enmity or repugnancy at all between the two.” Francis Bacon, The major woks, Oxford 
University Press 2008, p. 199.
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tilate himself. Efficient and final causes, the antecedent conditions as well 
as the purpose, are both quite evident. 
Now let us return to the examination of the notion of supernatural. 
Whether Mother Mary appears or a spirit manifests itself through a psy-
chic, although it makes perfect sense to ask “Why?”, it is utterly meaning-
less to ask “Whence?”. In other words we usually are able to make out 
some kind of purpose to the phenomenon, but we are helpless concern-
ing its’ antecedent conditions. But that just will not suffice for us to pre-
sume that something is supernatural. As we already have underpinned, 
not everything that falls out of the dominion of natural sciences could be 
presumed to be supernatural. Human will is not at all presumed to be su-
pernatural, although it does not obey or conform to the laws of nature. 
Thus, in order to presume an event or being as supernatural, it has to 
imply or entail the existence of some kind of will, other than human. In 
other words, in order to consider something to be supernatural, it ought 
to have no efficient, but only final causes, which, in turn, reside in no hu-
man intellect. If we embrace that view, we are ready to accede to the idea 
that the supernatural is nothing more than the natural manifestation of a 
will residing in a non natural being, given that the only natural beings in 
the universe capable of forming and possessing will are humans.
IV.
So far we have endeavored to define supernatural as a form of non hu-
man will, which resides in no natural brain but manifests itself through 
natural phenomena, so as it can be perceived by human sensory or in-
tellectual equipment. If this short text was dealing with the supernatural 
from the point of view of Metaphysics or Ontology, it ought to address 
a vast list of correlated ambiguities, concerning the essence of supernat-
ural, the degree and the way of its’ existence etc. Fortunately, our pur-
pose is only to examine the interconnections between the existence of 
the supernatural on the one hand and human morality on the other, so 
we can promptly bypass such an insidious reef. What really matters in 
our inquiry is the importance of that supernatural will to the formation 
and function of morality. Concerning that issue there exist two opposing 
views: some hold that morality is only an aftermath of the belief to the 
supernatural or, at least, that moral rules are founded on and sustained 
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by the presumed supernatural will, to wit God, angels and demons. Oth-
ers maintain that the formulation of ethics was only due to interrelations 
which were – and are – being formed in the framework of human society; 
hence morality is totally irrelevant to the existence of the so-called super-
natural. Even if the belief in the supernatural ceased to exist, they insist, 
morality would neither vanish nor devitalize. 
We will endeavor to exhibit that, whether the origins and the vivac-
ity of morality are to be found in the belief in the supernatural or not, 
the appeal to an external, non human, supernatural will is devastating for 
the very core of ethics. In other words, we intent to show that ethics al-
low only for human will, by the sole virtue of which can moral agents be 
praised or blamed for their choices and deeds. Before we proceed with 
our argumentation, though, we ought to refer to all possible modes of 
existence concerning the supernatural, assuming – for the shake of the 
debate – that the supernatural actually exists and has some kind of influ-
ence over morality. Given that we can perceive the existence of a super-
natural will by virtue of our sensory or intellectual equipment, it ought to 
be in some relation to the natural order. Consequently, the supernatural 
might [a] partake in nature, so as to be grasped through our senses in co-
operation with our intellectual forces. It might also [b] abstain from na-
ture, in which case intellect alone perceives the existence of it. Moreover, 
it could [c] identify with nature, a fact that would be perceived by both 
sensory and intellectual capabilities. Reason leaves no fourth alternative. 
VI.
The first [a] and the last [c] view call for panentheism and pantheism 
accordingly. The panentheistic aspect presumes a potentially omnipres-
ent supernatural will, which substantiates nature, but does not identify 
with it. In the words of Tertullian, it might be presumed as pervading 
through the natural world, just like honey pervades the honeycomb20. If 
that is the case, then natural reality may – in some degree, at least – be 
20. “Stoici enim uolunt deum sic per materiam decucurrisse quomodo mel per fauos, at 
tu ‘Non’, inquis, ‘pertransiens illam facit mundum, sed solummodo apparens et adpropin-
quans ei, sicut facit quid decor solummodo apparens et magnes lapis solummodo adpro-
pinquans”, Terulliani Liber Adversus Hermogenem, XLIV.
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regulated by the supernatural agency. In other words the circumstances 
in which human agents find themselves are – in part, at times, or poten-
tially – adjusted by something other than the laws of nature and their 
own agency. The panentheistic view presumes that nature identifies with 
– a part, at least – of the supernatural will, which supersedes it. Accord-
ing to Spinoza, the only substance that can possibly – by “possibly” he 
means logically – exist is God21. Matter and intellect can be nothing else 
than properties of God22, who is, anyway, infinite by all aspects and, con-
sequently, as far as his attributes are concerned23. Everything which to us, 
humans, seems to exist is just a mode – or modification – of the infinite 
existence of God24. 
According to the pantheistic aspect, all is God and God is all. Nature, 
universe and God are equivalent25. God identifies with the natural world. 
If that is the case, then separate beings are nothing more than manifesta-
tions of the divine essence, which reveals itself to itself. There is no bor-
derline between the beholder and the spectacle anymore, between the 
doer and the deed, between the natural and the supernatural. Everything 
is part of an all-encompassing immanent abstract God who, as Saint Au-
gustine puts it, “is a kind of womb of nature containing all things in Him-
self, so that the lives and souls of all living things are taken, according to 
the manner of each one’s birth, out of His soul which vivifies that whole 
mass”26.
Both panentheism and pantheism share the burden of common on-
tological and metaphysical inconsistencies, due to which they have been 
rejected by numerous thinkers and scholars during the past, as well as 
21. “Except God, no substance can be or be conceived”, Spinoza Benedictus de, Ethics, 
tr. Edwin Curley, Penguin Classics 2005, Part I, P14, p. 9, and “It follows, second, that an 
extended thing and a thinking thing are either attributes of God or (by A1) affections of 
God”, ibid. Cor. 2, p. 10.
22. “From the necessity of the divine nature infinite numbers of things in infinite 
ways... must follow”, ibid., Part I, P16, p. 13.
23. Ibid. Dem.
24. “Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow 
either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by 
a modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite”, Ibid. P23, p. 18.
25. T. N. Pelegrinis, Dictionary of Philosophy, Ellinika Grammata, Athens 2005, pp. 
449-450.
26. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, tr. P. G. Walsh, Aris & Phillips 2005, IV:12.
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at the present27. However, those who reject both pantheism and panen-
theism mainly focus on two points, to wit on agency28 and on free will29. 
It is quite obvious that a pantheistic or panentheistic universe allows for 
neither30. Accordingly, there can be no praise or blame, for either there is 
no one to praise or blame – besides the omnipresent and omniscient God 
–, or because there exist no agents possessing free will, but only pawns 
who dispatch a pre determined divine plan. Spinoza, the most promi-
nent naturalistic pantheist, rejects even the possibility of the existence of 
evil, since it is totally incomprehensible within the bounds of the one and 
only entity, that of divine essence. According to Spinoza the knowledge of 
27 “Ought not men of intelligence, and indeed men of every kind, to be stirred up to 
examine the nature of this opinion? For there is no need of excellent capacity for this task, 
that putting away the desire of contention, they may observe that if God is the soul of the 
world, and the world is as a body to Him, who is the soul, He must be one living being 
consisting of soul and body, and that this same God is a kind of womb of nature containing 
all things in Himself, so that the lives and souls of all living things are taken, according to 
the manner of each one’s birth, out of His soul which vivifies that whole mass, and there-
fore nothing at all remains which is not a part of God. And if this is so, who cannot see 
what impious and irreligious consequences follow, such as that whatever one may trample, 
he must trample a part of God, and in slaying any living creature, a part of God must be 
slaughtered? But I am unwilling to utter all that may occur to those who think of it, yet 
cannot be spoken without irreverence”, Augustine, De Civitate Dei, tr. P. G. Walsh, Aris & 
Phillips 2005, IV:12.
28. “All pantheism must ultimately be shipwrecked on the inescapable demands of eth-
ics, and then on the evil and suffering of the world. If the world is a theophany, then ev-
erything done by man, and even by animal, is equally divine and excellent; nothing can 
be more censurable and nothing more praiseworthy than anything else; hence there is no 
ethics”, Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, tr. E. F. J. Payne, 
Dover Publications 1966, Vol. II, Ch. XLVII.
29. “Concerning the rational animal himself,—that is, man,—what more unhappy belief 
can be entertained than that a part of God is whipped when a boy is whipped? And who, 
unless he is quite mad, could bear the thought that parts of God can become lascivious, 
iniquitous, impious, and altogether damnable? In brief, why is God angry at those who do 
not worship Him, since these offenders are parts of Himself?”, Augustine, De Civitate Dei, 
tr. P. G. Walsh, Aris & Phillips 2005, IV:13.
30. “…[Spinoza]… who finds it good that God be both the agent and the victim of all the 
crimes and miseries of man ... that there should be wars and battles when men are only the 
modifications of the same being, when consequently, only God acts ... is what surpasses all 
the monstrosities and chimerical disorders of the craziest people who were ever put away 
in lunatic asylums ... modes do nothing; and it is the substances alone that act and are act-
ed upon”, Pierre Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary, trans. Richard Popkin, Bobbs 
Merrill, Indianapolis 1965, p. 311.
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evil does not correspond to an actual entity, it is nothing but inadequate 
knowledge based on inadequate ideas, to wit ideas that do not adequately 
refer to God. Human beings may entertain inadequate ideas – and, con-
sequently, the idea of evil – due to their restricted and imperfect nature. 
Spinoza refers to the imperfection of human mind using the term “pas-
siveness”. An active mind knows no evil, entertains no evil emotions, and 
may even become able to look upon reality under the scope of eternity. 
Sub specie aeternitatis no evil exists, since the divine essence can only be 
infinitely good. The specific evil deed or unhappy issue, if placed within 
the major context of existence, is revealed to be utterly good. What Spi-
noza does is nothing more than to recognize and endeavor to confront an 
inconsistency which is intrinsic to both pantheism and panentheism. The 
evident dominance of evil over the natural world can not easily reconcile 
with an infinite, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient and perfect God31. 
Thus a pantheist ought either to deny the existence of evil or that of God32. 
Spinoza obviously opts for the first alternative and rejects the actual exis-
tence of evil and, consequently, that of sin; hence he totally casts away 
ethics from human interaction. According to Spinoza, the notion of evil 
is an aftermath of the imperfect human nature, of its inaptitude to grasp 
and comprehend adequate ideas. Like Socrates he associates evil with ig-
norance, but, unlike the former, he does so only in the level of the Theo-
ry of knowledge. While to the Greek philosopher evil deeds were actual 
consequences of ignorance, to his Hebrew fellow evil is only a phenom-
enal aftermath of actual intellectual inadequacy. To humans God works 
in mysterious ways, and what seems to be wrong, unfair, evil or sinful, is 
only a part of a divine plan totally incomprehensible to our restricted in-
tellectual capabilities. Traditional ethics is nothing more than the official 
recognition and expression of human inaptitude to grasp the whole im-
age. Such views were only likely to call forth the menace and counterblast 
31. Cf. Michael P. Levine, “Pantheism, theism and the problem of evil”, Philosophy of 
Religion 35: 129-151, 1994.
32. “Pantheists are bound to find the fact of evil (and especially moral evil) an enor-
mous embarrassment. It is difficult enough to square this fact with belief in an omnipotent 
and infinitely loving Creator. It is much more difficult to square it with the view that an 
evil world is an actual expression of God’s perfect nature”, H. P. Owen, Concepts of Deity, 
Macmillan, London 1971, p. 72.
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of Spinoza’s contemporaries33, who excommunicated34 him, anathema-
tized him with the anathema wherewith Joshua anathematized Jericho 
and cursed35 him “with all the curses in the Deuteronomy, even with the 
curse that Elisha pronounced to the children who, in consequence, were 
torn to pieces by the she-bears”36.
VII.
Although both pantheism and panentheism seem intrinsically unable 
to encompass moral evaluation and ethical considerations, many think-
ers have endeavored to reconcile ontological monism with independent 
agency, free will and personal ethics. Especially those who endorse the so 
called New Age movement tend to underpin the idea of ontological unity, 
considering it the touchstone of New Age ethics. Based upon unity, ethics 
can adopt a more ethical approach, since what is good and evil isn’t the 
mandate of something outside of us, but just the result of the way we are 
all interconnected. Instead of being based on fear of divine punishment 
or hope of heavenly reward, in the framework of New Age philosophies 
ethics comes from a mutual respect for all things; the better Pantheistic 
ethical decisions come from an awareness of mutual interrelation, to wit 
the fact that any harm done to another is doing harm to oneself because 
33. “[His] is the most monstrous hypothesis that could be imagined, the most absurd, 
and the most diametrically opposed to the most evident notions of our mind”, Pierre Bay-
le, Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections, “Spinoza”, Hackett Publishing Company 
1991.
34. “We ordain that no one may communicate with him verbally or in writing, nor show 
him any favour, nor stay under the same roof with him, nor be within four cubits of him, 
nor read anything composed or written by him”, Roger Scruton, Spinoza, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford 1986, p. 10.
35. “Cursed be he by day, and cursed be he by night; cursed be he when he lieth down, 
and cursed be he when he riseth up; cursed be he when he goeth out and cursed be he 
when he cometh in; the Lord will not pardon him; the wrath and fury of the Lord will be 
kindled against this man, and bring down upon him all the curses which are written in the 
Book of the Law; and the Lord will destroy his name from under the heavens; and, to his 
undoing, the Lord will cut him off from all the tribes of Israel, with all the curses of the 
firmament which are written in the Book of the Law; but ye that cleave unto the Lord God 
live all of you this day!”, ibid. p. 9.
36. Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, Touchstone 1967, p. 569.
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what harms one harms all. Much like Socrates and Spinoza, New Age 
thinkers bind together knowledge and morality.
An influential New Age philosophical system that endeavors to rec-
oncile monism with ethics is Ecosophy T, brainchild of the recently late 
Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, one of the most prominent of the 20th 
century. Ecosophy T is actually Naess’ ontology, from which he attempts 
to derive moral maxims37. 
According to Ecosophy T the whole universe constitutes an organic uni-
ty, which substantiates isolated entities. There exist transparent – though 
firm – bonds between individual beings, by which they are indissolubly in-
terconnected. Those bonds are not at all accidents, attributes which may or 
may not belong to a subject, without affecting its essence. On the contrary, 
they constitute essential properties, since if they are fractured, the specific 
being abolishes its personal identity, its essence. Every individual exists as 
such only due to the bonds by which it is interrelated with other beings. 
Every fractured bond reduces the specific being’s essence, and induces its 
transformation to something else. Entia actually derive their precise es-
sence from omnipresent, imperceptible, innumerable bonds38. There can 
not exist distinct, isolated beings39, individuals in vacuum. 
37. “By an ecosophy I mean a philosophy of ecological harmony or equilibrium. A phi-
losophy as a kind of sofia (or) wisdom, is openly normative, it contains both norms, rules, 
postulates, value priority announcements and hypotheses concerning the state of affairs in 
our universe. Wisdom is policy wisdom, prescription, not only scientific description and 
prediction. The details of an ecosophy will show many variations due to significant differ-
ences concerning not only the ‘facts’ of pollution, resources, population, etc. but also value 
priorities”, Arne Naess, “The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects”, 
Philosophical Inquiry 8, 1986, p. 18.
38. “The deep ecology movement rejects the human-in-environment image in favor of 
the relational, total-field image: organisms as knots in the biospherical net or field of in-
trinsic relations. An intrinsic relation between two things A and B is such that the relation 
belongs to the definitions or basic constitutions of A and B, so that without the relation, A 
and B are no longer the same things. The total-field model dissolves not only the human-
in-environment concept, but every compact thing-in-milieu concept— except when we 
speak at a superficial or preliminary level”, Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-
Range Ecology Movement”, Inquiry 16, 1973.
39. “We can make no firm ontological divide in the field of existence… there is no bi-
furcation in reality between the human and the non-human realms… to the extent that we 
perceive boundaries, we fall short of deep ecological consciousness” Fox Warwick, “Deep 
Ecology: A New Philosophy of Our Time?”, The Ecologist 14, 1984.
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Those thinkers who abide by that view maintain that the whole net of 
interrelations between entities is ontologically prior to the very specific 
entity, insofar as individualities are nothing but manifestations of those 
interrelations or, to be more precise, loca in which the above mentioned 
manifestation materializes40. If beings are viewed as such, and if the only 
way they may exist is just as co-existence and correlation, it is utterly mis-
leading to refer to beings instead to a sole, extended one. A human being, 
for example, and the forest which surrounds it, are nothing but fractions 
of the very same essence. In matter of fact, they are so closely connected, 
so as they could not be perceived as separate from each other, since the 
person distinct from the forest and the forest distinct from the person 
cease to be what they formerly were, when viewed under the scope of the 
between them existing interconnection41.
If individuals – human as well as non human – exist in the way they 
exist due to a vast net of infinite relations, by which they are intercon-
nected to other beings, it is evident that the diminishing of those rela-
tions would only lead to a deterioration of their very essence. In other 
words, the depilation of the nearby forest deprives you not only of the 
very forest, but at the same time shatters a group of formerly existing re-
lations between you and the trees, the brooks, the birds and animals who 
used to dwell in it etc., relations who decisively used to determined your 
essence. Thus you are ineffably mutated to something else, definitely dif-
ferent from what you used to be, you are impoverished and reduced to 
an elemental state of being. Every species which vanishes reduces your 
capability and potential of forming relations, leading thus to ontological 
destitution, since not only a species is annihilated, but also those who 
remain are deprived of the ability of forming relations and bonds with 
the extinguished one. On that account biodiversity as well as bioexuber-
40. Freya Matthews, “Relating to Nature: Deep Ecology or Ecofeminism”, The Trum-
peter 11 (4), 1994, p. 159.
41. “For some people however, this change of perspective follows from actions on be-
half of Mother Earth. I am protecting the rainforest develops to I am part of the rain-
forest protecting myself. I am that part of the rainforest recently emerged into thinking. 
What a relief then! The thousands of years of imagined separation are over and we begin 
to recall our true nature. That is, the change is a spiritual one”, John Seed, “Anthropocen-
trism”, in B. Devall and G. Sessions (eds.), Deep Ecology: Living as If Nature Mattered, 
Gibbs Smith, Layton 2001, p. 199.
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ance in the framework of Ecosophy T both obtain normative value42. They 
cease to be descriptive terms and become ideals, pursuits and aspirations 
for all beings, especially the moral ones, humans. The salvation of endan-
gered species and the sustentation of ecosystems become in the context 
of Ecosophy T an ethical imperatives43.
Naess recognizes that – besides humans – all other beings partake in 
that relational net rather passively, for they are unable to comprehend 
and affect the existing bonds between individuals. We, humans, on the 
contrary, are vi naturae apt to diminish or even extinguish species and, 
thus, relations between entities. One could easily jump to the conclusion 
that humans are considered to be moral agents exactly due to that, since 
we have not only the above mentioned ability, but also full consciousness 
of the fact that we possess it. According to Naess, though, this is not the 
case. The fact that humans destroy instead of protecting is not that much 
due to some kind of moral aberration; it is more due to a kind of cog-
nitive fallacy, caused by ontological deficiency44. Abiding by the Socratic 
conception of morality, the Norwegian philosopher assigns moral vice to 
ignorance; human beings that do not respect and, consequently, do not 
protect the natural world, do so only because they fail to realize the den-
sity – or, even, the very existence – of the relational net, which correlates 
and thus substantiates separate entities.
The ontological relation between humans and their environment is ac-
tually one of direct dependence and intimate interconnection, so as a hu-
man being could not be taken for as such in vacuum, isolated from its en-
vironment45, unless we are theorizing while developing a thought experi-
ment46. Humans are da sein or in der Welt sein, and exactly that is what 
42. Arne Naess, “The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects”, Philo-
sophical Inquiry 8, 1986, pp. 11-31.
43. Arne Naess, Ecology Community and Lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge 1989, pp. 29-32.
44. Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue, The Deep Ecology Movement: an Introductory 
Anthology, North Atlantic Publishers, Berkeley 1995, p. 8.
45. “When we explore our own embodied, in place, ecological Self we discover our af-
finities with other beings as part of our humanity”, Alan Drengson, “An Ecophilosophy 
Approach, the Deep Ecology Movement, and Diverse Ecosophies”, The Trumpeter 14 (3), 
1997, pp. 110-111.
46. Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement”, Inquiry 
16, 1973, p. 95.
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renders them humans47. In order to fully develop itself, a human being 
needs to understand that, what it actually is and whatever it can become 
depends on the bonds it forms and sustains with other beings. That kind 
of understanding is enough for man to achieve what Naess calls Self-real-
ization!, which, as Naess puts it, is not a descriptive, but rather a norma-
tive – that means, ethical – term. The normative function of the notion is 
underpinned by the exclamatory mark (!) which is used next to it48. Self-
realization! for humans comes trough thorough comprehension of their 
very essence. The depth and the degree of this comprehension is based 
on the understanding of the relational net that constitutes reality, as well 
as of the bonds between beings which are formed inside this net, since if 
it were not for them, no being would be what it is. Facing and accepting 
that indisputable reality the human being turns to a different form of ex-
istence; it opens itself to the world that surrounds it, breaks the bounds 
of its limited, restricted subsistence and achieves actual existence. Ac-
cording to Naess, a person is thus endowed by a broader, extended Self 
(whom Naess signifies with capitalized “S”, so as to underpin its essen-
tial difference to the former self), a self who supersedes the existential 
boundaries defined by its skin, a self who extends for as far as its ontolog-
ical relations impose49. The new, extended Self constitutes a being, some 
parts – or members – of which actually lay beyond its physical body50. 
The realization of that fact on behalf of a human being unavoidably leads 
it to identify with the other beings of creation and, eventually, with the 
wholeness of creation51. Identification generates compassion, which is a 
natural human tendency towards every being we happen to identify with. 
By virtue of compassion the distinction between me and the environment 
vanishes, and it’s now clear that what I used to refer to as myself actu-
47. “Our human self in the deepest sense cannot be separated from the earth from 
which we have grown”, Alan Drengson, “An Ecophilosophy Approach, the Deep Ecology 
Movement, and Diverse Ecosophies”, The Trumpeter 14 (3), 1997, pp. 110-111.
48. Alan Drengson, “Shifting Paradigms: From the Technocratic to the Person-Plane-
tary”, Environmental Ethics 2 (3), 1980, pp. 221-240.
49. Paul Shepard, “Ecology and Man—A Viewpoint”, The Subversive Science, Houghton 
Mifflin Co., New York 1969, p. 3.
50. Arne Naess, “Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World”, The 
Trumpeter 4 (3), 1987, p. 36.
51. Alan Drengson, “An Ecophilosophy Approach, the Deep Ecology Movement, and 
Diverse Ecosophies”, The Trumpeter 14 (3), 1997, p. 111.
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ally encompasses its environment, animate or inanimate52. Embracing 
that view Arne Naess discharges Ecosophy T from the obligation to as-
cribe moral rights or intrinsic moral values to the natural world, a task 
which for other moral systems has proven to be disastrous. Unlike other 
philosophical approaches, the monistic system of Ecosophy T holds that 
moral agents are not moved to their deeds concerning their environment 
by some kind of moral obligation, but due to deep understanding of the 
actual nature of the reality that surrounds them; having already realized 
that their very essence is nothing more than an intersection in the net of 
existence, moral agents act instinctively out of spontaneity; they vindicate 
the “interests” of the natural world not because they abide by some vague 
and obscure moral principle, but because they impulsively desire to do so. 
According to Naess’ Ecosophy T the prescriptive imperative – by virtue of 
which the will of moral agents is regulated – is solely the comprehension 
of the whole universe as a unity in process53. Hence moral agents care for 
and defend the best interests of all beings for the same reason parents 
hasten to care about their children: not because abstract meditation re-
veals to them that their offspring are conveyors of intrinsic moral value, 
but because they simply identify and sympathize with them54.
VIII.
It is evident that Naess, like many New Age thinkers, opts for ontolog-
ical holism in his effort to construe reality. Individual essence is not the 
locus where properties or attributes reside or manifest themselves, but it 
52. “When I realize that I don’t have any independent existence, that I am part of a food 
chain, for instance, then at a certain point Me-first and Earth-first become inseparable. I 
feel that’s the best position to be coming from—to realize one’s identity with the Earth. 
“Myself” now includes the rainforest, it includes clean air and water”, John Seed, “Deep 
Ecology Down Under,” in Christopher Plant and Judith Plant (ed.), Turtle Talk: Voices for 
a Sustainable Future, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia 1990, p. 199.
53. Fox Warwick, “Post-Skolimowski Reflections on Deep Ecology”, The Trumpeter 3 
(4), 1986, p. 16.
54.“Someone endowed with ecological consciousness would care for nonhuman beings 
for the same reason that parents care for their child: not because moral reflection reveals 
that the child has intrinsic value, but rather because the parents identify with the child”, 
kevin Doak, Dreams of Difference: The Japan Romantic School and the Crisis of Moder-
nity, The University of California Press, California 1994, p. 21.
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is mostly an emergent, the sum of infinite relations. Naess rejects the idea 
of a static and stable – though inaccessible – essence. Instead he prefers 
the dynamic holistic view, according to which the essence of a being is 
in constant modification and reformation, due to the relations it annexes 
with other beings. In the bottom line, these relations actually constitute 
the very essence of all beings. Therefore, milieu is ontologically prior to 
the individual, relations prior to essence, the whole prior to the part. In 
fact Naess presumes that individual entities are just the opportune and 
fortuitous forms of that whole at a given time. One could rightfully in-
fer that Naess’ ontological view is not a long cry from Spinoza’s concep-
tion. Spinoza’s God in Naess’ Ecosophy T is now called relational net, 
but remains all-encompassing and all-substantiating. Both systems view 
individual beings as the sheer manifestation of a universal wholeness, a 
vague supernatural will, who arts mysteriously and in secrecy55. Spinoza’s 
naturalistic pantheism – or, better, panentheism – is utilized56 in the con-
text of Ecosophy T to create a cosmic Self that includes “not only men, an 
individual human, but all humans, grizzly bears, whole rainforest ecosys-
tems, mountains and rivers, the tiniest microbes in the soil and so on”57. 
Nevertheless, such a cosmic self is thus broad, impersonal and trans-
parent, so as it could not be seen as the self of a moral agent. No deeds 
can emanate from such a self, only events can take place around him58. 
Furthermore, what seems to be deliberate action is only an emergent, the 
outcome generated by the intersection of infinite translucent relations 
55. “Humanity surfaces in a vague and unearthly form to embrace everyone in a realm 
of universal guilt… that verges on the supernatural”, Murray Bookchin, “Social Ecology 
versus Deep Ecology: A Challenge for the Ecology Movement”, Socialist Review 8 (3), 1988, 
pp. 9-29.
56. Naess recognizes his debt to Spinoza: “he already felt a strong identification with 
Spinoza’s Ethics. Already he had decided that he wanted to be a philosopher. He deeply 
trusted Spinoza and felt that Spinoza’s account of his worldview and life’s philosophy had 
shown the way to deep inquiry and practical action that leads to community, friendship, 
and joy.” Allan Drengson, “The life and work of Arne Naess: an appreciative overview”, The 
Trumpeter 21 (1), 2005, p. 9, and “…he appreciated more fully how well his encounters with 
the mature philosophy of Spinoza had taught him how to have a sense for the whole of the 
world and life. This sense for a total view, which can only be spelled out in a fragmentary 
way”, ibid. p. 16.
57. Murray Bookchin, “Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology: A Challenge for the Ecology 
Movement”, Socialist Review 8 (3), 1988, pp. 9-29.
58. T. N. Pelegrinis, Humans, Animals, Machines, Ellinika Grammata, Athens 1987, p. 13.
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which constitute the vast net of organic unity. Naess endeavored to re-
lieve his New Age ontological approach from what has been the Achilles’ 
heel for pantheism: the abolishment of personal ethics. He adopted the 
holistic view in order to justify spontaneous, intuitive and impulsive ac-
tion on behalf of the moral agent. What he achieved, however, was to en-
tirely cast away moral blame or praise, even the very existence of moral 
agents. If the borderline between me and the beings that surround me 
vanishes, then there remains no one for me to harm or benefit. Even if 
there were separate selves, and even if they could deliberately interact, 
in the context of a deterministic universe they could bear no moral re-
sponsibility59. For every moral choice, action or attitude would only be 
imposed by the relations formed in the framework of the vast net of or-
ganic unity. Hence an evil deed, a sin or a vice would only be an after-
math of a random intersection of ontological relations, one which nobody 
could disdain or demerit, since its existence would serve the elaboration 
of that relational net, rendering thus beings richer and broader. In other 
words, a world without evil would be a much indigent one, and the be-
ings that constitute it would be impoverished. Furthermore, according to 
Naess’ view what seems to be morally blameworthy, sub species aeterni-
tatis – or, under the scope of organic unity – can only be necessary and 
inevitable60. 
Holistic ethics are in fact no ethics at all. Every effort to found ethics 
on ontology or metaphysics has proven to be extremely unsuccessful, and 
quite risky a task. Ethics needs neither ontology nor metaphysics, for it is 
just a human convention, a social one. Ethics should only be an adequate 
and functional convention; there is no need that they are founded on un-
shakable, firm metaphysical or ontological ground.
59. “So-called pantheistic systems have often been characterised and challenged in the 
assertion that they abrogate the distinction between good and evil, and destroy freedom. 
Perhaps one would express oneself quite as definitely, if one said that every such system 
fantastically dissipates the concept of existence”, Sǿren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscien-
tific Postscript, trans. D.F. Swenson and W. Lowrie, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
1944, p. 111.
60. Russell Bertrand, A History of Western Philosophy, Touchstone 1967, p. 588.
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